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203 N. LASALLE FIVE YEARS LATER:
ANSWERS TO THE OPEN QUESTIONS
PAUL B. LEWIS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

From the advent of the new Bankruptcy Code in 1978 until
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Bank of America National
Trust and Savings Association v. 203 N. LaSalle Street
1 the ongoing vitality of the so-called new value
Partnership,
exception to the absolute priority rule had been a heavily litigated
2
topic and one much debated among academics. In 203 N. LaSalle,
3
The Court's
the Court finally confronted the issue directly.
Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School. J.D., Yale Law
School; B.A., Northwestern University.
1. 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
2. See generally, Walter W. Miller, Jr., Bankruptcy's New Value Exception:
No Longer a Necessity, 77 B.U. L. REV. 975 (1997); Robert M. Zinman, New
Value and the Commission: How Bizarre!, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 477
(1997); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, New Value, Fresh Start, 3 STAN. J. L.
Bus. & FIN. 125 (1997); David R. Perlmutter, Navigating a Proposed "New
Value" Plan Through the Cross-Currents of the Confirmation Process: An
Arduous Journey for the Debtor of a Single-Asset Real Estate Case, 17
WHITTIER L. REV. 427 (1996); Michelle Craig, The New Value Exception: A
Plea for Modification or Elimination, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 781 (1995); Julie L.
Friedberg, Wanted Dead or Alive: The New Value Exception to the Absolute
Priority Rule, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 893 (1993); Anthony L. Miscioscia, Jr., The
Bankruptcy Code and the New Value Doctrine:An Examination into History,
Illusions, and the Need for Competitive Bidding, 79 VA. L. REV. 917 (1993);
Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 9
(1992); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's
Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1990); Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 229 (1990); John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After
Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963 (1989); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
BargainingAfter the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute PriorityRule, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 738 (1988); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy
Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36
EMORY L. J. 1009 (1987).
3. On two prior occasions, the Court had granted certiorari in new value
cases. In 1988, the Court decided Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485
U.S. 197 (1988). Ahlers considered the question of whether the promise by the
owners of a failing family farm of future 'labor, experience and expertise" was
sufficient for the confirmation of a plan of reorganization that otherwise did
not satisfy the requirements of the absolute priority rule. Id. at 199. While
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opinion, while implicitly recognizing the continuing validity of the
new value exception, left open numerous questions about how and
when the exception should be applied.
In Part II of this Article, I address the controversy
surrounding the new value exception to the absolute priority rule.
In Part II, I provide an overview of plan confirmation in Chapter
11, including the development of the absolute priority rule, and I
trace the pre-203 N. LaSalle history of the new value exception to
the absolute priority rule. In Part III, I discuss the Court's opinion
in 203 N. LaSalle. In Part IV, I identify some policy issues and
note certain potential strategies for debtors and creditors in light
of 203 N. LaSalle. And in Part V, I identify some of the "open
issues" following 203 N. LaSalle and discuss whether and how
lower courts have provided answers to these open questions.
II. PLAN CONFIRMATION IN CHAPTER 11 AND THE EVOLUTION OF
THE NEW VALUE EXCEPTION TO THE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE

A. Plan Confirmation Requirements
To confirm a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, thirteen requirements must be satisfied.4 Each
of these requirements is mandatory, except one-that the plan be
consensual. 5 Creditors vote on a plan by class. 6 A favorable vote
can be obtained in either of two ways. Any class of claimants
whose interests are unimpaired7 under the plan is automatically
deemed to accept the plan.8 Alternatively, an impaired class may
vote in favor of a plan. To do so, both the majority of creditors in
the class must vote in favor of the plan, and the claims of those
voting for the plan must have a dollar value equal to at least twothe Court stated that "the statutory language and the legislative history
of
§ 1129(b) clearly bar any expansion of any exception to the absolute priority
rule beyond that recognized ... at the time Congress enacted the
1978
Bankruptcy Code," the Court did not expressly recognize the validity
of the
new value exception. Id. at 206. In addition, in 1994, the Court granted
certiorari on a new value exception case called Bonner Mall Partnership
v.
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. (In re Bonner Mall Partnership), 2 F.3d 899
(9th
Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 1039 (1994). However, this case settled
before the Court had an opportunity to decide it.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)-(13) (2000).
5. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (stating that all holders of claims and interests
may vote on the plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1126(a) ("The holder of a claim or. interest
allowed under section 502 of this title may accept or reject a plan.").
7. A class is said to be impaired unless certain specified requirements
are
met which essentially leave unaltered the rights of the party in question.
See
11 U.S.C. § 1124.
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124, 1126(f).
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9
thirds of the dollar value of all of the claims in the class.
As long as the plan is consensual, the debtor's ability to retain
ownership is determined contractually based upon the agreement
of the parties, rather than upon the underlying rule of law. If the
plan is not consensual, however, and an impaired class rejects the
plan, the plan can still be confirmed in what is known as a
cramdown, 10 so long as certain requirements are met. These
requirements include that at least one class of impaired creditors
1
who are not insiders has accepted the plan,' that the plan does
not discriminate unfairly, that the "best interests test" is
13
satisfied, 12 and that the plan is deemed to be "fair and equitable."
There are two methods of satisfying the fair and equitable
requirement, depending on the status of the creditor's claim. For
dissenting secured creditors, a plan is fair and equitable and can
be crammed down if the secured creditor effectively receives the
4
full economic equivalent of its secured claim.' The Code provides
5
three methods of accomplishing this.' First, a dissenting secured
creditor may keep its lien and receive payments on the plan's
6
effective date equal to the amount of the secured claim;' second,7
claim;'
the creditor may receive the indubitable equivalent of its
with
lien,
the
or third, the property can be sold free and clear of
the
of
the creditor's security interest attaching to the proceeds
8
of
either
under
sale.' This lien on proceeds may then be treated
9
the other two options.'
For impaired, dissenting unsecured creditors, a plan is
deemed to be fair and equitable if it satisfies the terms of the
absolute priority rule. The absolute priority rule has its origins
both in the interpretation of the phrase "fair and equitable" and in
contract law. Because creditors have priority over equity under
state law, for a plan to be fair and equitable, this order of priority
20
Hence, the derivation of
must be retained in a reorganization.
in respect to a class of
that
the absolute priority rule, which holds
of claimants can
class
dissenting unsecured creditors, no junior

9. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
12. The best interest test requires the dissenting impaired class of creditors
to receive at least as much as it would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
14. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i).
17. Id. § 1129 (b)(2)(A)(iii).
18. Id. § 1129 (b)(2)(A)(ii).
19. Id.
20. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 502-05 (1913).
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receive a penny in a cramdown unless all senior classes are paid in
full.21
Thus, a plan is fair and equitable with respect to an
impaired, unsecured class if that class will receive full
compensation for its allowed claim before any junior class receives
any distribution.22
The absolute priority rule sets the parameters for one end of
the negotiation in bankruptcy between the debtor and its
unsecured creditors. The prospect that the debtor may ultimately
liquidate frames the other end of the dynamic. In a consensual,
negotiated reorganization, the unsecured creditors may receive
some value even if the debtor's assets are fully encumbered. This
is not the case in a liquidation-secured creditors will receive
everything, and the claims of the unsecured creditors will be
valueless. Thus, the threat of liquidation creates incentives for a
class of unsecured creditors to accept a plan that impairs its
interests.
Taken in conjunction with the rest of the Bankruptcy Code,
the absolute priority rule provides for a distribution in a
cramdown that mirrors the priority scheme established under
state law. Also, taken at its face, the absolute priority rule
seriously calls into doubt the chance of old equity of a company
whose assets truly cannot meet its liabilities ever participating in
the reorganized debtor absent creditor agreement. This continued
involvement by old equity, presumably, represents the very
purpose the debtor sought bankruptcy protection in the first place.
B.

The New Value Exception to the Absolute PriorityRule
The new value exception to the absolute priority rule raises
the question of whether existing shareholders who make
additional, necessary cash contributions to a reorganized entity
21. Title 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) provides:
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and
equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims (i)the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive
or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
or
(ii)the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior claim or interest any property.
22. Prior to the adoption of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the absolute priority
rule went even further in this regard. Under former Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act, absolute priority had to be maintained for all classes of
creditors, irrespective of whether each class consented to the plan. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 501-676(c)(3) (1976). Under Chapter 11, absolute priority may be waived
by a class that consents to do so. 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
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can retain their equity in the reorganized entity when the
proposed reorganization plan is neither consensual nor satisfies
23
The absolute priority rule states that
the absolute priority rule.
shareholders have to pay dissenting, general unsecured creditors
in full before they are allowed to retain any interest in the new
The exception suggests that notwithstanding a plan's
firm.
inability to satisfy the absolute priority rule, the infusion of new
capital by the equity may justify its retention of an equity interest
in the reorganized debtor.
To understand the new value exception, a brief historical
The statutory language of the old
overview is necessary.
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 provided, inter alia, for creditors to
consent to plans of reorganization that impaired their interests,
and it required plans of reorganization to be "fair and equitable."
However, the 1898 Bankruptcy Act did not define what that
phrase "fair and equitable" meant.
As noted, the absolute priority rule resulted both from an
interpretation of the phrase "fair and equitable" and as a rule of
contract law. Because creditors have priority over equity under
state law, it follows that for a plan to be fair and equitable, this
24
Hence, the derivation of the
order of priority must be retained.
penny of a senior class has
last
the
absolute priority rule, in which
class.
a
junior
of
penny
first
the
priority over
The idea of a new value exception arose in dicta as a result of
the equitable principles inherent in the bankruptcy process. The
first case to note the exception was Kansas City Terminal Railway
25
Co. v. Central Union Trust Co. In dicta, the Court noted that it
had the right to modify on equitable grounds the strict priority
scheme over the objection of junior creditors when the senior
secured creditor, whose claim exceeded the value of the firm,
consented, as long as the shareholder of the debtor agreed to

23. The Supreme Court phrased the question as follows:
The issue in this Chapter 11 reorganization case is whether a debtor's
prebankruptcy equity holders may, over the objection of a senior class of
impaired creditors, contribute new capital and receive ownership
interests in the reorganized entity, when that opportunity is given
exclusively to the old equity holders under a plan adopted without
consideration of alternatives. We hold that old equity holders are
disqualified from participating in such a "new value" transaction by the
terms of 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), which in such circumstances bars a
junior interest holder's receipt of any property on account of his prior
interest.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n. v. 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S.
434, 437 (1999).
24. See N. Pac. Ry. Co., 228 U.S. at 508 (requiring creditors to be paid
before stockholders).
25. 271 U.S. 445 (1926).
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contribute new value to the reorganized company. 26 The critical
aspect of this determination is that in Kansas City, the senior
creditor's claim exceeded the value of the firm's assets. Thus, the
junior claimants would have received nothing in a liquidation. As
such, the key to this dicta is that the proposal in question did not
materially differ from a scenario whereby the firm was sold to the
secured creditor, who then allowed the old equity to buy into the
27
new firm.
The next case of historical relevance is Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Products Co.28
In Case, a major theoretical
transformation occurred. The bankruptcy judge in Case allowed
the existing equity to retain an interest in the reorganized debtor
based on the promise of continuing management, influence and
good will in the community. 29 Unlike in Kansas City, the Case
judge allowed this retention over the objection of the senior
creditors. The Supreme Court reversed the holding. Justice
Douglas said that what was proffered was insufficient to allow
equity to retain an interest in a non-consensual plan. What was
proposed by the equity was not tangible cash and had no place in
the asset column of the balance sheet of the business. 30 But,
without commenting on the factual differences between Kansas
City and Case, Justice Douglas indicated that the Court had not
categorically rejected a new value exception.
It might be a
different story, he stated, if the shareholders would contribute
"money or money's worth" to get the business back on its feet. 31
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code codified the meaning of the
phrase "fair and equitable." As the term applies to dissenting,
unsecured creditors, it is defined as satisfying the absolute priority

26. Id. at 454-55.
27. For a more recent case employing the same analysis, see In re Genesis
Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 617-18 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001):
The objectors are correct that the new Management Incentive Plan,
while characterized as consideration for continued employment, borders
on payments to management on account of their pre-petition equity
interests....
Such an allocation might indeed be violative of the
absolute priority rule, in light of the relatively small dividend proposed
to be paid to unsecured creditors, and the extinguishment of equity
interests

otherwise.

Nevertheless

. .

. the

issuance of stock

and

warrants to management represents an allocation of the enterprise
value otherwise distributable to the Senior Lenders, which the Senior
Lenders have agreed to offer to the top executives as further incentive to
them to remain and effectuate the debtor's reorganization. The Senior
Lenders are free to allocate such value without violating the "fair and
equitable" requirement.
28. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
29. Id. at 112-13.
30. Id. at 122-123.
31. Id. at 122.
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rule of § 1129(b)(2). Following 1978, the meaning of the phrase
thus appeared to no longer depend-upon common law analysis.
This did not end the debate. Prior to the Court's 1999 decision in
203 N. LaSalle, courts had essentially taken three approaches to
the question of the new value exception. One approach followed
32
the reasoning of Dewsnup v. Timm, in which the Supreme Court
stated that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code did not alter pre-Code
contained
judicially created practice unless the legislative history
33
this
Thus,
so.
do
to
intent
the
of
discussion
at least some
the
and
subject
the
on
silent
is
Code
the
since
argument proceeds,
the
survived
Case
of
rule
the
silent,
virtually
is
legislative history
34
Code.
1978
the
of
enactment
A second, opposite approach, was based on the fact that
§ 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code replaced the Case
standard of "fair and equitable" with a Congressionally enacted
standard. This new standard contains no reference to a new value
exception. As a result, according to this argument, since the words
of the statute are clear on their face, the appropriate conclusion
appears to be that the new3 5value exception failed to survive the
enactment of the 1978 Code.
The third approach suggests that the new value exception is
not an exception to the absolute priority rule at all. The absolute
priority rule prohibits retention of one's interest in a reorganized
entity "on account of' old interests. In cases where old equity is
32. 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
33. Id. at 419-20.
34. Courts that had followed this view include In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2
F.3d 899, 912 (9th Cir. 1993) ("When Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it
does not start from scratch. The Bankruptcy Code should not be read to
abandon past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress
intended to do so.") (citations omitted); Coones v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 B.R.
247, 255 (D. Wyo. 1994) (upholding the new value exception because it is "a
well-established pre-Code principle which Congress failed to explicitly
repudiate when it enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code"); In re Sovereign Group
1985-27, Ltd., 142 B.R. 702, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("Where Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of judicially created concepts, it makes
that intent specific; absent such specific intent, it is presumed that Congress
did not intend to change prior-existing law.").
35. For examples of this line of reasoning, see In re Drimmel, 108 B.R. 284,
289 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989) (stating that it views "Congress' failure to include
the exception in this new definition as the significant factor here rather than
its failure to expressly repudiate the exception"); Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2,
Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The
language of the Code strongly suggests that [the new value exception] did not
[survive], and we are to take this language seriously even when it alters preCode practices."); Piedmont Assocs. v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 132 B.R.
75, 79 (N.D. Ga. 1991) ("This court believes that the plain language of
§ 1129(b)(2)(B) and the intent of Congress precludes the existence of any new
value exception to the absolute priority rule.").
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contributing new capital, the argument goes, its retained interest
in the reorganized debtor is based on this new contribution, "not
on account" of a prior interest.36 Thus, the absolute priority rule is
not violated in such instances.
III. THE 203 N. LASALLE CASE
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Bank of America
National Trust and Savings Association v. 203 N. LaSalle Street
Partnership.37 The debtor in 203 N. LaSalle was a single-asset
limited partnership that owned fifteen floors of a downtown
Chicago office building. Bank of America had lent the debtor $93
million, secured by a non-recourse first mortgage on the debtor's
principal asset, its office space.
Following default and the
commencement of foreclosure proceedings, the debtor filed under
Chapter 11.
36. In re Bonner Mall P'ship illustrates this approach. The case involved a
traditional single-asset scenario, and the debtor's plan provided, inter alia, for
the partners to receive nothing on their claims. However, to raise additional
capital for the new corporation, the partners would contribute a total of
$200,000 in cash to Bonner Mall Properties in exchange for 2 million of the 4
million authorized shares of the new corporation's common stock. No other
persons were designated to receive stock in exchange for such contributions.
In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d at 905. The court held that the Code permits
the confirmation of a reorganization plan that provides for the infusion of
capital by the shareholders of the bankrupt corporation in exchange for stock
if the plan meets the conditions that plans were required to meet prior to the
Code's adoption. Among its arguments, the Court stated that if the value
added by the old equity was in fact new, substantial, in money or in money's
worth, was necessary for a successful reorganization, and was reasonably
equivalent to the value or interest received, the plan would not violate the
absolute priority rule because it would not give old equity property "on account
of' prior interests, but instead would allow the former owners to participate in
the reorganized debtor on account of a substantial, necessary, and fair new
value contribution. Id. at 911.
37. 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
Prior to 203 N. LaSalle, Norwest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988), was the only post-Code case in
which the Supreme Court dealt with the new value exception. In 1994, the
Court granted certiorari on a new value exception case called U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 510 U.S. 1039 (1994). However, this case
settled before ever reaching the Court. Ahlers considered the question of
whether the promise by the owners of a failing family farm of future "labor,
experience, and expertise" was sufficient for the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization that otherwise did not satisfy the requirements of the absolute
priority rule. Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 199. The Court found that the owner's
promise was "intangible, inalienable, and in all likelihood unenforceable", and,
quoting the language of Case, held that it "has no place in the asset column of
the balance sheet of the new [entity]." Id. at 204 (quoting Case, 308 U.S. at
122-23). The Court went on to state that "the statutory language and the
legislative history of § 1129(b) clearly bar any expansion of any exception to
the absolute priority rule beyond that recognized in our cases at the time
Congress enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code." Id. at 206.
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The bankruptcy court confirmed a plan that provided for the
following: Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506, the Bank's $93 million
claim was split into a secured claim of $54.5 million and an
unsecured deficiency claim of $38.5 million. Under the terms of
the debtor's plan, the Bank's secured claim was to be paid in full
over a period of seven to ten years by means of a note secured by a
The plan classified the Bank's
mortgage on the property.
unsecured deficiency claim separately from the unsecured claims
of trade creditors, 38 and proposed to discharge the Bank's
unsecured claim for an estimated sixteen percent of its present
value. The remaining $90,000 of unsecured claims would be paid
in full, without interest, on the plan's effective date. As no interest
would be paid to the class of general unsecured creditors, this class
was deemed impaired; thus, a vote in favor of the plan by this
class would satisfy the § 1129(a)(10) requirement that at least one
class of impaired claims accept the plan. Finally, under the plan,
certain of the debtor's former partners would contribute $6.125
39
million in new capital over a five-year period in exchange for
100% ownership of the reorganized debtor. This provision was
exclusive to the debtor's former equity holders; they were the only
parties eligible to contribute new capital in exchange for new
equity.
Bank of America objected to the plan on the grounds of the
absolute priority rule-former equity holders would receive
property even though the Bank's unsecured deficiency claim would
not be paid in full. The bankruptcy court approved the plan
nevertheless, and the district court affirmed. By a 2-1 decision,
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the confirmation of the debtor's plan,
holding that "the new value corollary remains a part of our
bankruptcy jurisprudence. 40 The Seventh Circuit found that old
equity retained its interest "on account of' its new "infusion of
capital" rather than "on account of' its "prior equitable ownership
of the debtor."41 The dissent argued that since there was nothing
ambiguous about the statutory text of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), and since
the Bankruptcy Code's language includes no express new 42value
exception, confirmation of the plan should have been denied.
Shortly after the Seventh Circuit's opinion in 203 N. LaSalle
came down, the Second Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's 203
N. LaSalle reasoning in Coltex Loop Central Three Partners v.

38. The legitimacy of this separate classification was not raised before the
Supreme Court.
39. The contribution was worth $4.1 million in present value.
40. In re 203 N. LaSalle St. P'ship, 126 F.3d 955, 967 (7th Cir. 1997).
41. Id. at 964.
42. Id. at 971-73 (Kanne, J., dissenting).
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BT/SAP Pool Associates (In re Coltex).43 The facts of Coltex were
materially similar to those of 203 N. LaSalle.
Coltex also dealt with a partnership holding title to singleasset real estate. Like in 203 N. LaSalle, the secured creditor in
Coltex was vastly undersecured. The Coltex debtor proposed a
cramdown plan under which the partners of the debtor would
retain property in the reorganized entity and pay their unsecured
creditors (including the secured creditor's deficiency claim) ten
percent of the value of their claims.44 Pursuant to the plan, the
debtor had neither attempted to market the property for sale nor
had it tried to identify any source of financing other than the
partners' contributions of new value. Only the old partners were
permitted to contribute to the plan; there was no opportunity for
45
bids from other parties.
The Second Circuit held that partners were receiving
property "on account of' their old equity position. 46 The court's
reasoning was based on the absence both of competitive bids and
of competing plans, as well as the lack of exposure to the market.
The court stated that "old equity was the lender of first
opportunity, rather than the lender of last resort."47 But the
Coltex court did not hold that the new value exception did not
exist. Rather, the court ruled that had the market for the property
been adequately tested, it might have been possible for old equity
to show that it was not receiving its interest on account of its prior
48
position.
In its 203 N. LaSalle opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court did not
expressly decide whether the Bankruptcy Code in fact includes a
new value exception. Rather, the Court determined that even if
the exception was encompassed within the Code, the debtor's
proposed plan would still fail to satisfy § 1129 (b)(2)(B)(ii).49 The
core rationale of the opinion is that § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) was violated
since the plan, adopted without consideration of alternatives and
over the objection of a senior class of impaired creditors, gave the
debtor's pre-bankruptcy equity holders the exclusive opportunity
to contribute new capital and receive ownership interests in the
50
reorganized entity.
The Court began its analysis by noting that the statutory

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

138 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 44-45.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. at 44-46.
203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 454.
Id. at 456-58.
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51
language contained in the Bankruptcy Code is "inexact." It thus
proceeded to trace the development of the pre-Code absolute
priority rule, now codified at § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), emphasizing that
the new value exception pre-Code "never rose above the technical
52
level of dictum in any opinion of [the] Court," and that before the
enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code, no court had ever
a plan that gave old equity
relied on the dictum in Case to approve 53
a property interest after reorganization.
The Court next determined that the relevant legislative
history did not eliminate the possibility that the codified absolute
priority rule in fact encompasses a new value exception. The
Court stated:
Although there is no literal reference to "new value" in the
phrase "on account of such junior claim," the phrase could
arguably carry such an implication in modifying the
prohibition against receipt by junior claimants of any interest
class of unconsenting creditors
under a plan while a senior
54
goes less than fully paid.

Turning to the statutory language, the Court considered three
possible meanings of the phrase "on account of." The first was
that the language "on account of' means something like "in
55
The Court rejected this
exchange for," or "in satisfaction of."
56
interpretation. The second position, also rejected by the Court, is
51. Id. at 444.
52. Id. at 445.
53. Id. at 445-46.
54. Id. at 449.
55. Id. at 449-450.
56. It did so for two reasons, one textual, the other practical. As for the
former,
[S]ubsection (b)(2)(B)(ii) forbids not only receipt of property on account
of the prior interest but its retention as well. A common instance of the
latter would be a debtor's retention of an interest in the insolvent
business reorganized under the plan. Yet it would be exceedingly odd to
speak of "retaining" property in exchange for the same property interest,
and the eccentricity of such a reading is underscored by the fact that
elsewhere in the Code the drafters chose to use the very phrase "in
exchange for," § 1123(a)(5)(J) (a plan shall provide adequate means for
implementation, including 'issuance of securities of the debtor... for
cash, for property, for existing securities, or in exchange for claims or
interests)".
203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449-50 (internal citation omitted).
As for the latter,
[t]he unlikelihood that Congress meant to impose a condition as
manipulable as subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii) would be if "on account of' meant
to prohibit merely an exchange unaccompanied by a substantial infusion
of new funds but permit one whenever substantial funds changed hands.
"Substantial" or "significant" or "considerable" or like characterizations
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the more common understanding that "on account of' means
"because of."5 7 Rather, the Court turned to a "less absolute
statutory prohibition" that would better "reconcile the two
recognized policies underlying Chapter 11, of preserving going
concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors."58
The Court suggested that presumably a new value plan would
violate absolute priority
whenever old equity's later property would come at a price that
failed to provide the greatest possible addition to the bankruptcy
estate, and it would always come at a price too low when the equity
holders obtained or preserved an ownership interest for less than
someone else would have paid. A truly full value transaction, on the
other hand, would pose no threat to the bankruptcy estate not posed
by any reorganization, provided of course that the contribution be in
59
cash or be realizable money's worth.
The Court, however, specifically declined to decide what level
of causation was required to bar a new value plan. 60 Although the
Court stated that "the Debtor's exclusive opportunity to propose a
plan under § 1121(b) is not itself 'property' within the meaning of
subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii),"'61 the Court observed that the debtor's plan
was "doomed ... by its provision for vesting equity in the
reorganized business in the Debtor's partners without extending

of a monetary contribution would measure it by the Lord Chancellor's
foot, and an absolute priority rule so variable would not be much of an
absolute.
Id. at 450.
57. While recognizing that "what activates the absolute priority rule" is "a
causal relationship between holding the prior claim or interest and receiving

or retaining property." Id. at 451. The court's rationale for rejecting this
standard was the following:
If, as is likely, the drafters were treating junior claimants or interest
holders as a class at this point then the simple way to have prohibited
the old interest holders from receiving anything over objection would
have been to omit the "on account of' phrase entirely from subsection
(b)(2)(B)(ii). On this assumption, reading the provision as a blanket
prohibition would leave "on account of' as a redundancy, contrary to the
interpretive obligation to try to give meaning to all the statutory
language. One would also have to ask why Congress would have desired
to exclude prior equity categorically from the class of potential owners
following a cramdown. Although we have some doubt about the Court of
Appeals's assumption that prior equity is often the only source of
significant capital for reorganizations, old equity may well be in the best
position to make a go of the reorganized enterprise and so may be the
party most likely to work out an equity-for-value reorganization.
Id. at 452-53 (citations omitted).
58. Id. at 453.
59. Id. at 453-54.
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id.
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an opportunity to anyone else either to compete for that equity or
The Court
to propose a competing reorganization plan."62
emphasized that
the exclusiveness of the opportunity, with its protection against the
market's scrutiny of the purchase price by means of competing bids
or even competing plan proposals, renders the partners' right a
property interest extended "on account of' the old equity position
63
and therefore subject to an unpaid senior creditor class's objection.
The Court observed that although it could be argued that the
opportunity has no market value, it stated that "the law is settled
that any otherwise cognizable property interest must be treated as
sufficiently valuable to be recognized under the Bankruptcy
Code.'64
The critical issue in the opinion seems to be the Court's
statement that it would be "necessary for old equity to
demonstrate its payment of top dollar" 65 to ensure that it did not
receive its interest in the reorganized debtor on account of its
former equity interest. And, "the best way to determine value is
exposure to a market,"66 not by judicial valuation. 67 However, the
Court declined to give detailed guidance regarding the means to
accomplish this. It concluded:
Whether a market test would require an opportunity to offer
competing plans or would be satisfied by a right to bid for the same
interest sought by old equity, is a question we do not decide here. It
is enough to say, assuming a new value corollary, that plans
providing junior interest holders with exclusive opportunities free
from competition and without benefit6s of market valuation fall within
the prohibition of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred. The
concurrence argued that neither of the two options for confirming
non-consensual plans had been met.69 The Bank did not get
property equal to the allowed amount of its claim, nor was the
absolute priority rule satisfied. In addition, the concurrence
contended that old equity received at least two forms of property
under the plan: First, it received the exclusive opportunity to
obtain equity, and second, it retained an equity interest in the
reorganized entity. Since this was sufficient to determine the
outcome, the majority's "speculations about the desirability of a
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 454.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 459 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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'market test'. . . are dicta binding neither this Court nor the lower
federal courts." 70 As for relying on prior practice, the concurrence
stated that the "Code's overall scheme often reflects substantial
departures from various pre-Code practices ....
Hence it makes
little sense to graft onto the Code concepts that were developed
71
during a quite different era of bankruptcy practice."
Justice Stevens dissented. In his dissent, he stated "that a
holder of a junior claim or interest does not receive property 'on
account of such a claim when its participation in the plan is based
on adequate new value."72 As long as the interest is not at a
bargain price, it does so "on account of' its prior claim. 73 As for the
exclusive option to purchase, "[w]hat the Court refuses to
recognize, however, is that this 'exclusive opportunity' is the
function of the procedural features of this case: the statutory
exclusivity period, the Bankruptcy Judge's refusal to allow the
bank to file a competing plan, and the inescapable fact that the
74
judge could confirm only one plan."
IV. POLICY AND STRATEGY RELATED TO

203 N.

LASALLE

A. Policy
An initial policy analysis of 203 N. LaSalle begins with one
central question-namely, why might we desire that new value
plans be possible under the Code. There are a number of possible
rationales. 75 The first relates to the basic proposition that more

70. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 459-60 (Thomas, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 461-62 (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. In practice, the new value exception is overwhelmingly employed in
single-asset real estate cases. See David Gray Carlson & Jack F. Williams,
The Truth About the New Value Exception to Bankruptcy's Absolute Priority
Rule, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1303, 1305 n.10 (2000) (noting that an empirical
survey of post-Ahlers cases shows ninety-two percent of new value cases
involve real estate); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Preemptive
Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 645 n.91 (1991) ("The new value
exception appears to play a negligible role in the reorganization of large,
publicly held companies."). It is thus worth noting that there has been some
significant discussion about whether single-asset real estate cases should be
allowed to reorganize at all. The argument against allowing reorganization in
single-asset cases is that single-asset real estate cases are essentially twoparty disputes better handled by state foreclosure law.
For a detailed
discussion, see Kenneth Klee, One Size Fits Some: Single Asset Real Estate
Bankruptcy Cases, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1285, 1301 (2002). See also Douglas
G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 356, 371 (2001) (arguing that Chapter 11 is inefficient compared to the
alternative of mandatory auction); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Critiquing the

20041

203 N. LaSalle Five Years Later

bidders in general results in better auctions. The more interested
76
bidders, the greater the price the auction is likely to return,
which in turn means more funds available for distribution to
creditors.7 7 Further, a rational equity holder may bid more than a
rational third-party creditor or a third-party buyer. This is the
case for a number of reasons. First, as illustrated by 203 N.
LaSalle, in many cases (particularly single-asset real estate
partnerships), the old equity holders benefit from preserving tax
Second, equity holders are already
attributes of ownership.
familiar with the business and are thus less likely to discount
their bids for unknown risks. Other motivations may include
family name and identity associated with the business or
embarrassment over failure to pay creditors. Finally, the equity
holders may also have personal liability, such as guaranties,
linked to the continuation of the business, or personal income
opportunities, such as employment compensation or management
78
fees.
An additional justification for desiring the availability of new
value plans may be to increase the likelihood that the business
79
The
may successfully reorganize rather than be liquidated.
ForeclosureProcess:An Economic Approach Based on the ParadigmaticNorms
of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REV. 959, 989 (1993) (stating that expeditious and
inexpensive foreclosure is a key part of the ex ante bargain that allows lenders
to keep down interest rates). See generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC
AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAw (1986) (arguing bankruptcy should interfere
with state law created rights primarily to solve common pool problems).
76. For a discussion, see Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the
Literature,13 J. ECON. SURVS. 227, 239 (1999).
77. However, with respect to the single-asset case, the practical value of an
auction of the debtor's equity may be questioned. Some courts have noted that
the market for equity participation for failing businesses (particularly small
failing businesses) is thin. See, e.g., In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 227
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993). The typical disclosure statement does not in all
likelihood permit a fully informed investing public to participate. Thus, as a
practical matter, bidding may well be limited to one or two major creditors and
the insiders. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 2, at 9; Judith Greenstone Miller &
John C. Murray, The "New Value" Exception: Myth or Reality After Bank of
America National Trust & Savings Association v. 203 N. LaSalle Street
Partnership?, 104 COM. L.J. 147 (1999).
78. See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations,44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991) [hereinafter Markell,
Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority]; Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting
Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON. 633, 647-52 (1993).
79. There is no doubt that reorganization has traditionally been seen as
generally preferable to liquidation. See, e.g., United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) ("By permitting reorganization, Congress
anticipated that the business would continue to provide jobs, to satisfy
creditors' claims, and to produce a return for its owners. Congress presumed
that the assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a rehabilitated
business than if 'sold for scrap."') (citations omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
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reorganization process may be viewed as more than a collective
proceeding for the enforcement of rights held by creditors under
state law. Rather, liquidations may have a negative impact on
jobs, suppliers to businesses, and the economy as a whole. The
ability of shareholders to remain in control and rehabilitate the
business encourages reorganization instead of liquidation.80
Is there policy that goes against the desirability of new value
plans? The answer depends on whom one believes should be given
ultimate discretion to determine the future of insolvent firms.
New value plans remove the ultimate decision of a firm's future
from creditors, who effectively own insolvent firms,81 and largely
give that power to the equity holders, who do not share the same
risk-reward incentives that creditors do when dealing with
insolvent firms. As a result, creditors lose their "right" to block
confirmation of plans that would otherwise violate the absolute
priority rule.
Removing this power from creditors cuts against certain basic
concepts. The notion of keeping ultimate decision making power
with those who bear the risk of loss--creditors-is consistent with
the notion that when a firm becomes insolvent outside of
95-595, at 220 (1977)).
80. However, as noted, the vast majority of new value cases have
historically involved single-asset real estate cases, not operating businesses.
In such cases, with a relatively small pool of unsecured debt and no employees,
the only competing interests appear to be the secured creditor and the equity,
who are likely concerned about tax ramifications of a sale. In such cases,
failure to confirm a new value plan and subsequent foreclosure on the
property does not effect the cessation of business. It merely causes title to
change hands. See Zinman, supra note 2, at 498-500.
81. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, 908 F.2d at 1360 ("Creditors effectively
own bankrupt firms."). In fact, the fiduciary duty of a firm's directors shifts
upon insolvency from the firm's shareholders to its creditors. See Am. Nat'l
Bank of Austin v. Mortgageamerica Corp. (In re Mortgageamerica), 714 F.2d
1266, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Becoming insolvent, the equitable interest of the
stockholders in the property, together with their conditional liability to the
creditors, places the property in a condition of trust, first for the creditors, and
then for the stockholders.") (quoting Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150
U.S. 371, 383 (1893)). See also Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d
Cir. 1981) (stating that "[i]f the corporation was insolvent at that time it is
clear that defendants, as officers and directors thereof, were to be considered
as though trustees of the property for the corporate creditor-beneficiaries.")
(quoting N.Y. Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397,
398 (N.Y. 1953)); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe
Communications Corp., No. 12510, No. CIV.A.12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) ("At least where a corporation is operating in the
vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the
residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise."); FDIC v.
Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[W]hen the corporation
becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the
stockholders to the creditors.").
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bankruptcy, the fiduciary duty of the firm's directors and officers
shifts from shareholders8 2 to creditors.8 3 The rationale for this is
82. A solvent corporation does not owe creditors the same fiduciary
obligations. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores,
Inc.), 225 B.R. 646, 652-53 (Bankr., N.D. Ill. 1998).
The shareholders, after all, own the corporation and management of the
corporate assets is vested in the directors. The directors are therefore
entrusted with the control and management of the property of others.
As frequently happens when a person is so entrusted with the property
of others, the law imposes fiduciary obligations on that person.
Creditors, on the other hand, deal with corporations by entering into
Satisfaction of their claims against the corporate assets
contracts.
So long as the
requires only compliance with their contracts.
corporation is solvent, they require no additional protection; by
definition, a solvent corporation, no matter how badly managed
otherwise, is able to satisfy its contractual obligations.
Id. See also Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1417 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing
that under New York law, it is a "well-established" principle that "a
corporation does not have a fiduciary relationship with its debt security
holders").
83. Many courts have supported this proposition. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 ("At least where a corporation is
operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the
agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate
enterprise."). In such instances, "circumstances may arise when the right
(both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may
diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the
employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if
given the opportunity to act." Id. at *36 n.55. See also Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d
at 976-77 ("[W]hen a corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the
directors shifts from the stockholders to the creditors."); In re Kingston Square
Assocs., 214 B.R. 713, 735 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[I]t is universally agreed
that when a corporation approaches insolvency or actually becomes insolvent,
directors' fiduciary duties expand to include general creditors."); Geyer v.
Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 787 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("[W]hen the
insolvency exception does arise, it creates fiduciary duties for directors for the
benefit of creditors."). See also Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and
Pragmatismof Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 103, 108 (1998).
In a growing number of cases, courts hold that managerial allegiance
must shift to the creditors when the corporation approaches insolvency.
Upon insolvency, the residual claims of the shareholders become
Creditors who go unpaid in the event of
economically worthless.
complete financial failure now occupy the position of residual owners.
Thus, it is not surprising that managerial allegiance should depend
upon the fortunes of the business.
Id. See generally Michael D. Sabbath, Liability of Officers and Directors for
Pre-Petition Management of the Financially Troubled Company, (Mercer
University School of Law) (on file with author and the John Marshall Law
Review). A number of courts have held that while a fiduciary duty extends to
the creditors upon insolvency, it also remains with the shareholders as well.
See, e.g., Sanford Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe Brown & Co., 157 U.S. 312, 317-19
(1895) (holding that the directors of an insolvent corporation, which was still a
going concern intending to continue its business, stood in a fiduciary
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straightforward. As the court in Steinberg v.Kendig (In re Ben
FranklinRetail Stores, Inc.)s 4 explained,
The economic rationale for the "insolvency exception" is that the
value of creditors' contract claims against an insolvent corporation
may be affected by the business decisions of managers. At the same
time, the claims of the shareholders are (at least temporarily)
worthless. As a result, it is the creditors who "now occupy the
'8 5
position of residual owners.

Thus, equity bears essentially no risk once a firm is insolvent.
And those who bear no risk have every incentive to engage in
behavior which maximizes their own prospects of recovery while
threatening the value held by the secured creditors.8 6 Secured

relationship to both the stockholders and the creditors); In re
Mortgageamerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1277 (holding that officers and directors
of insolvent corporations "are fiduciaries to the corporations' stockholders and
creditors") (quoting Hassett v. McColley (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs.), 28 B.R.
740, 759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983)); Geyer, 621 A.2d at 789 ("[E]xistence of the
fiduciary duties at the moment of insolvency may cause directors to choose a
course of action that best serves the entire corporate enterprise rather than
any single group interested in the corporation at a point in time when
shareholders' wishes should not be the directors only concern.").
84. 225 B.R. 646.
85. Id. at 653 (quoting Geyer, 621 A.2d at 787). This shift in fiduciary duty
is often described in terms of the creation of a trust fund to be utilized for the
benefit of corporate creditors. See, e.g., Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d
808, 813 (Del. 1944) ("An insolvent corporation is civilly dead in the sense that
its property may be administered in equity as a trust fund for the benefit of
creditors.") (citations omitted); Clarkson Co., 660 F.2d at 512 ("If the
corporation was insolvent at that time it is clear that defendants, as officers
and directors thereof, were to be considered as though trustees of the property
for the corporate-beneficiaries [creditors].") (quoting N.Y Credit Men's
Adjustment Bureau, 110 N.E.2d at 398). See also D. BLOCK, ET AL., THE
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 597

(5th ed. 1998). But see St. James Capital Corp. v. Pallet Recycling Assocs. of
N. Am., Inc., 589 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).

Creditors are not owed a duty by an insolvent corporation's directors
and officers to minimize any loss that may occur as a result of the
corporation's insolvency. To hold otherwise would allow creditors of a
corporation, solvent or insolvent, to interfere unduly and interject
themselves in the day-to-day management of the corporation. While it
is axiomatic that creditors have the right to be repaid, it is equally true
that they do not have the right, absent an agreement to the contrary, to
dictate what course of action the directors and officers of a corporation
shall take in managing the company, or... to direct how the assets of
the corporation shall be disposed of to satisfy the debts of the
corporation.
Id.
86. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A
Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 97, 107 (1984) ('Members of any group of investors that would be
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creditors, by contrast, have a fixed upside, but bear the risk of
loss. 8 7 By placing the ultimate decision-making power in the
hands of the equity by allowing new value plans, two results
follow. First, as noted, the decision-making process is placed in
the hands of an inappropriate party. And second, the heightened
88
to a rise in the cost of credit and a
risk to creditors may lead
89
limit on its availability.
203 N. LaSalle provides additional financial protection for
undersecured and unsecured creditors in Chapter 11. As noted,
the Supreme Court determined that to be consistent with the goal
of maximizing creditor return, old equity needs to pay at least as
much as any third party would pay for a bankruptcy court to
conclude that their interest in the reorganized entity is not "on
90
The Court also made noises
account of' their prior interests.
be creditor-driven by
should
suggesting that ultimate decisions
self-determination, 91
economic
for
reflecting a general preference
eliminated by a present liquidation or sale of assets have nothing to lose by
seeking a solution that avoids a final distribution today.").
87. See, e.g., Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and CorporateRisk
Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101, 123 (1997) ("Because such claimants have
fixed claims, they will not benefit from any potential increase in value
resulting from the reorganization. In the event of catastrophe, however, such
creditors may bear some of the losses.").
88. See, e.g., Robert J. Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express: Corporate
Reorganization and the Secured Creditor's Rights of Reclamation, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 509, 515-16 (1975).
The institution of secured credit, which makes capital available to high
risk enterprises which could not otherwise obtain it, is making a vital,
economic
contribution toward
an irreplaceable,
and perhaps
expansion .... While the contingency of nonenforcement will not affect
all potential borrowers equally, since the stronger would just have to
pay more for their credit, while the weaker would be denied credit
altogether, its effect on the cost of credit, and thereby upon economic
growth, is undeniable.
89. As the Australian Law Reform Commission noted in contemplating
major changes to the Australian business reorganization laws: "[Als a matter
of economics, it would be undesirable to impede the flow of credit by devaluing
the security or other rights which a creditor may require as a condition of
giving credit." AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM'N, 1 REPORT No. 45: GENERAL
INSOLVENCY INQUIRY 49 (1988), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/
au/other/alrc/publications/reports/45/.
90. "A truly full value transaction, on the other hand, would pose no threat
to the bankruptcy estate not posed by any reorganization, provided of course
203 N.
that the contribution be in cash or be realizable money's worth ....
LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453-54.
91. Congress enacted Chapter 11 with the "view that creditors and equity
security holders are very often better judges of the debtor's economic viability
and their own economic self-interest than courts, trustees, or [governmental
agencies such as] the SEC." 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 458 n.28 (quoting G.
Eric Brunstad, et al., Review of the Proposals of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission Pertainingto Business Bankruptcies: Part One, 53 BUS.
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rather than a view that Chapter 11 should be a "court-driven,
debtor-protective regime." 92
But 203 N. LaSalle failed to
normalize investment incentives by returning them to a scenario
where bankruptcy investment incentives remain economically
comparable to those that exist under non-bankruptcy law.93 To do
this, investment incentives must reflect both potential gain and
potential loss. Outside of bankruptcy, equity has both something
to gain and something to lose. They thus have appropriate
incentives to make economically rational decisions. Inside of
bankruptcy, the appropriate risk-reward incentives rest with the
creditors, not the equity, and the equity in turn has economic
incentives to undertake unduly risky action. 94 This is antithetical
to the primary goals of bankruptcy. 95
So while 203 N. LaSalle guaranteed unsecured creditors the
maximum value which the market would bear in return for their
being forced to accept a plan they opposed, it did not return control
to the creditors themselves to determine the firm's future. This
lack of creditor control may well lead to undesirable results. As
Professors Baird and Jackson have written:
Bankruptcy law makes a grave mistake if it assumes that a junior
(or another class) will make the correct decision about the
deployment of the assets without a legal rule that forces it to take
account of investors as a group .... [T]he best way of ensuring the
correct decision - by which we mean that the decision that is not
distorted by the self-interest of individuals at the expense of the
group - is to create a legal rule that imposes upon the person who
makes the decision all the benefits if he decides correctly and all the

LAW. 1381, 1406 n.136 (1998)).
92. See G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and
the Broader Implications of the Supreme Court's Analysis in Bank of America
v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership, 54 BUS. LAW. 1475, 1479-80 (1999).
93. Id. at 1480 (arguing for competitive choice theory in the bankruptcy
context, meaning that "the best decisions regarding what is to be done with
bankrupt debtors, their obligations, and their assets are more likely to be
realized if decision-making in the bankruptcy context is made to approximate
decision-making in the context of financially healthy firms outside the
bankruptcy arena").
94. There are insolvency systems which afford secured creditors these
powers. For example, the Australian approach to insolvency, known as
Voluntary Administration, allows secured creditors with a lien on
substantially all of the debtor's assets to in effect opt out of the bankruptcy
proceeding and foreclose on its security, and the prospect of cramdown on both
secured and unsecured creditors is far more limited in Australia than it is in
the United States. Paul B. Lewis, Trouble Down Under: Some Thoughts on
the Australian-American Corporate Bankruptcy Divide, 2001 UTAH L. REV.
189, 194-95.
95. Brunstad & Sigal, supra note 92, at 1482-83.
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costs if he guesses wrong.96

B. Strategy
The 203 N. LaSalle opinion created a different framework for
creditor and debtor attorneys in thinking about possible
confirmation of new value plans with 203 N. LaSalle-type facts.
Among the strategies for creditor lawyers to consider post-203 N.
LaSalle are the following:
* Purchase other unsecured claims by making an offer
to all unsecured creditors for close to full payment. In
single-asset cases, this amount is likely to be low.
* Object to the separate classification of the unsecured
deficiency claim from the other non-insider general
unsecured claims.
* Object to the favorable treatment of general
unsecured claims (other than the deficiency claim), on
the grounds that it constitutes "artificial impairment"
and on the grounds of unfair discrimination.
* Contest a low valuation of the collateral.
* Contest the interest rate and terms of repayment
proposed by the debtor for the treatment of the
secured claim in the plan.
* Move to terminate or to shorten the debtor's exclusive
period to file a plan.
* Propose a competing plan, possibly a liquidating plan,
under which the collateral is sold shortly after
confirmation.
* Object to confirmation of the debtor's new value plan
unless it is subject to a true auction that allows other
creditors and third parties to bid and acquire postconfirmation equity.
Possible strategies for debtors' lawyers to consider post-203
N. LaSalle to increase the likelihood of confirmation include:
* Purchase the small non-insider unsecured claims and
aggregate them in a class that will vote to accept the
plan.
* Separately classify the non-insider unsecured claims
and treat them well in order to obtain their vote,
while continuing to impair them so that their vote
counts as an accepting class.
* Protect the initial 120-day exclusivity period by
providing frequent reports to the court and creditors
about progress toward a restructuring plan.
* File a plan of reorganization within the 120 days; do
96. Baird & Jackson, supra note 86, at 124-25.
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not assume the debtor will obtain an extension beyond
that date.
Do not rely on continuing exclusivity once a new value
plan is filed.
Insure that the new value contribution is significant
in relation to the non-insider general unsecured
claims.
Give careful thought to whether the new contribution
should be used to pay pre-petition unsecured claims,
for
post-confirmation
working
capital
or
improvements in the property, or for both.
Give careful thought to the auction provided for by the
plan. Consider whether the auction should invite
participation by creditors only or also by outsider
investors. Also, consider potential difficulties that
could accompany auctions, such as having overly
restrictive bidding rules, unnecessarily high entrance
fees, minimum bids, non-refundable deposits, and the
like.
Consider whether to engage a broker or investment
advisor to actively search for alternative financing or
purchasers.

V. THE "OPEN ISSUES" FOLLOWING 203 N. LASALLE

Shortly after the release of the 203 N. LaSalle opinion,
commentators began to note two significant omissions in the
Supreme Court's opinion.
The first deals with the issue of
causation.9 7 The Court held that the debtor's plan was doomed
since it vested "equity in the reorganized business in the Debtor's
partners without extending an opportunity to anyone else either to
compete for the equity or to propose a competing reorganization
plan."98 That is, there was a direct causal relationship between
the status of old equity and its right to participate in the
reorganized debtor. Thus, under the Court's ruling, old equity is
not per se barred from participating in the reorganized entity, but
its participation cannot be wholly on account of its prior status.
However, the Court specifically declined to decide what level of
causation was required to bar a new value plan from being

97. See, e.g., Robert J. Keach, LaSalle, the "Market Test" and Competing
Plans: Still in the Fog, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (2002) (discussing the debate
over whether competing bids or competing plans are appropriate); Hieu T.
Hoang, Comment, The New Value Exception to the Absolute PriorityRule After
In re 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership: What Should Bankruptcy Courts Do,
and How Can Congress Help?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 596-98 (2000).
98. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 454.
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confirmed. 99
The second omission dealt with the question of the market
100 The critical element of the Court's opinion appears to be
test.
the concept that old equity must demonstrate its payment of top
dollar.101 The best way to determine value is exposure to the
market. However, the Court declined to give direct guidance on
how this demonstration of "top dollar" should be accomplished.
Following the Court's opinion, it remained unclear whether a
market test requires an opportunity to offer competing plans, or
whether it can be satisfied by a provision in the debtor's plan
under which creditors and other third parties are afforded the
right to bid for the interest sought by old equity. 102
A number of other omissions have subsequently become clear
as well. Five years after the ruling in 203 N. LaSalle, as a general
matter, lower courts have been reluctant to provide much guidance
in terms of exploring the ramifications of 203 N. LaSalle. Not only
does there appear to be a shortage of cases which involve factspecific determinations, but courts also appear reluctant to take
the reasoning behind 203 N. LaSalle and expand it to its logical
limits. I now examine some of the key "open questions" and
discuss what, if any, treatment these questions have received by
lower courts post-203 N. LaSalle.
A. Does the New Value Exception Continue to Exist?
10 3
This appears to be the easiest of the "open issues." Courts
and commentators10 4 have interpreted the Supreme Court's
99. Id.
100. See Keach, supra note 97, at 18 (noting that the Supreme Court failed
to define "market test"); Bruce A. Markell, LaSalle and the Little Guy: Some
Initial Musings on the Ultimate Impact of Bank of America, NT & SA v. 203 N.
LaSalle Street Partnership, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 345, 353-55 (2000) [hereinafter
Markell, LaSalle and the Little Guy].
101. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453-54.
102. See Markell, LaSalle and the Little Guy, supra note 100, at 354-55
(contemplating the effects of the 203 N. LaSalle decision upon the bankruptcy
legal community).
103. See, e.g., In re Davis, 262 B.R. 791, 799 n.9 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2001)
(noting that the Ninth Circuit recognizes the validity of the new value
exception); Bank of Am. Commercial Fin. Corp. v. CGE Shattuck, LLC (In re
CGE Shattuck, LLC), Nos. 99-12287-JMD, CM-99-747, 1999 WL 33457789, at
*5-6 (Bankr. D. N.H. Dec. 20, 1999) (noting approvingly the previous decisions
that recognized the new value exception).
104. See Margaret A. Mahoney, Commercial Real Estate Defaults, Workouts,
and Reorganizations: Confirmation of Chapter 11 Plans, SJ076 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
Course of Study Materials 555, 559 (2004); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, New
Value, After LaSalle, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 2 (2003) (noting that the outcome of
the Supreme Court's 203 N. LaSalle decision reaffirmed the existence of the
new value exception); Carlson & Williams, supra note 75, at 1303-04 (2000)
(expressing alternative views on the Supreme Court's vindication of the new
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opinion as an implicit recognition of the ongoing viability of the
new value exception. This conclusion is buttressed in a number of
ways. First, it is supported by the Court's conclusion that the
legislative history does not eliminate the possibility "that the
absolute priority rule now on the books as subsection (b)(2)(B)(ii)
may carry a new value corollary."105 Second, it follows from the
Court's rejection of the Government's "starchy" argument that
former equity holders categorically should be barred from
participating in the reorganized debtor.10 6 And finally, it follows
from the Court's careful discussion of the specific flaws in the 203
N. LaSalle plan. If the exception does not exist, why would the
Court bother to hold the debtor's plan to such scrutiny?10 7 Thus, it
appears that under appropriate conditions, new value plans are
confirmable.
B. Must Exclusivity Be Terminated?
There is no doubt that following 203 N. LaSalle, former
equity holders may not have the exclusive opportunity to
participate in the reorganized entity. But this does not settle the
question completely about what precisely 203 N. LaSalle means in
regard to the exclusivity period. Does 203 N. LaSalle require
termination of exclusivity for any proposed new value plan? Or
rather, does 203 N. LaSalle merely hold that no new value plan
filed during the debtor's exclusivity period be confirmable unless it
provides for a true market test? If the latter, must competing bids
by creditors and other third parties be allowed to contest for the
equity in the reorganized debtor, or is it sufficient to allow some
other determination, such as expert testimony, that old equity is
in fact paying the highest price that the market will bear for the
new equity shares?
Post-203 N. LaSalle case law on the issue has been mixed.
value exception).
105. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 449.
106. Id. at 451.
107. One interesting interpretation is that the Supreme Court's decision in
203 N. LaSalle changed the focus of the debate from a linguistic debate over
whether the Code is plain or ambiguous to a more useful debate over the issue
of valuation and what constitutes fair value. See George H. Singer, Supreme
Court Clarifies "New Value Exception" to Absolute Priority Rule-Or Does It?,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., 1, 33, 47 (July/August 1999) (discussing the implications
of the 203 N. LaSalle decision on new value plans); Mark A. McDermott,
Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Before and After the Supreme Court's Stillborn
Decision in 203 North LaSalle, 46 FED. LAW. 22, 27 (1999). The Court's
insistence on a market test of valuation and its expression of distrust of
judicial valuations in determining fair value is a consistent theme that has
appeared in other recent Supreme Court bankruptcy decisions. See BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 547 (1994); Assocs. Commercial Corp. v.
Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 965 (1997).
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Some courts have opted for the competing bid option within the
debtor's plan.108 Other courts have terminated exclusivity so that
10 9
an approach supported by
competing plans may be proffered,
many commentators and the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission. 110 However, the concern has been expressed that
terminating exclusivity to allow competing plans might not create
a sufficient market in small and mid-size Chapter. 11 cases, which
form the bulk of Chapter 11 cases in terms of number of filings."'
Some courts have deemed either option sufficient to satisfy the 203

108. See In re CGE Shattuck, 1999 WL 33457789, at *7 (ordering the debtor
to amend its plan to provide for a competitive market determination). See also
In re Minkoff, No. 97-22962-11-JAR, 1999 WL 1424987, at *9 (Bankr. D. Kan.
Dec. 6, 1999) . But see NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE
NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT § 2.4.15, at 562-63 (1997) [hereinafter
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS] (criticizing the equity auction
approach).
The difficulty with the auction approach is that it divests the court of its
own independent review of the factors required for confirmation of a new
value plan and requires establishing an auction process and
reorganization plan format acceptable to the debtor as well as to
potential bidders. The debtor can structure the terms of the auction to
advantage old equity. If no one bids at the auction except the debtor,
the debtor's bid is accepted. Auctions, without more, do not eliminate
the possibility of self- dealing.
Id.
109. For example, in In re Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 252 B.R. 859, 860
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2000), the debtor's plan contained a provision for competing
bids. The court held that the inclusion of the bid procedure justified
terminating exclusivity, finding that the "Debtor's exclusive right to propose
and gain acceptance of a plan has effectively been forfeited because any party
can bid on the Debtor's equity interest and assume control of the Debtor if the
bidder is successful." Id. at 865. The Court held that where there is another
bidder interested, terminating exclusivity is a better procedural option than
an auction. The rationale for this is that the disclosure statement that would
accompany any other proposed plan would help bidders make an informed
choice. Id. at 865. See also In re Davis, 262 B.R. at 799.
110. See Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority, supra note 78, at
118-19 (1991); BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, supra note 108,
§ 2.4.15, at 555 (arguing that the rule about valuation and exclusive bidding
should not be too harsh).
[T]he Commission also recommends a significant additional condition:
exclusivity should be lifted as of right whenever a debtor seeks to
confirm a cramdown plan under section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) that uses
equity contributions from former equity holders ....

The best way to

accomplish this marketplace validation of value is to permit other
parties to propose plans of reorganization that may garner creditor
support to compete when the debtor moves for confirmation of an
unsecured creditor cramdown plan.
Id.
111. That is, the cost to creditors of preparing and confirming a plan might
be too high. See Markell, LaSalle and the Little Guy, supra note 100, at 354.
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N. LaSalle market test approach.112
A related question is if a court allows competing plans to be
set forth in order to satisfy the market test, how should a court
determine which of a number of confirmable plans to choose? The
Code itself provides limited guidance. Section 1129(c) states:
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section and except as
provided in section 1127(b) of this title, the court may confirm only
one plan, unless the order of confirmation in the case has been
revoked under section 1144 of this title. If the requirements of
subsections (a) and (b) of this section are met with respect to more
than one plan, the court shall consider the preferences of creditors
and equity security holders in determining which plan to confirm. 113
Courts faced with multiple confirmable plans have
historically looked at a number of factors to balance in
determining which plan to confirm. These factors have typically
included: "(1) the type of plan;1' 4 (2) the treatment of creditors and
equity security holders under each plan; (3) the feasibility of the
plan; and (4) the preferences of creditors and equity security
holders.115 The last factor is generally determined by a question
on the ballot of a multi-plan confirmation vote asking interested
parties to indicate their preference among the plans they vote to
confirm.116

Prior to 203 N. LaSalle, courts facing multiple confirmable
plans had to balance all of these factors. No single elementincluding which plan provided for the highest payout to
112. Consider In re Union Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 303 B.R. 390, 424 (Bankr.
E.D. Mo. 2003), which provides:
To test the price contribution by old equity for the consideration to be
secured by old equity, either (i) the exclusive period for a debtor to file a
plan of reorganization must be terminated; or (ii) the consideration that
the old equity holder will receive must be offered or exposed to a market
test to ensure that the old equity holder is providing fair value for that
consideration. The Supreme Court did not define precisely how that
market test was to be determined.
For one court's guidance on how to avoid violating the absolute priority rule,
see In re Global Ocean Carriers,Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 49 (Bankr. D. Del. 2000),
which states:
[T]he Debtors must subject the "exclusive opportunity" to determine who
will own Global Ocean to the market-place test .... This can be

achieved by either terminating exclusivity and allowing others to file a
competing plan or allowing others to bid for the equity (or the right to
designate who will own the equity) in the context of the Debtor's Plan.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(c).
114. Reorganizations plans are typically favored over liquidating plans. See
In re Holley Garden Apartments, Ltd., 238 B.R. 488, 495 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1999); In re Valley View Shopping Center, L.P. 260 B.R. 10, 21 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 2001).
115. In re Holley GardenApartments, 238 B.R. at 493.
116. Id. at 495-96.
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creditors 11 7-was universally controlling. 203 N. LaSalle raises an
obvious question-given its emphasis on the market and payment
of top dollar for equity in the reorganized debtor, does 203 N.
LaSalle in fact dictate that a court faced with choosing among
more than one confirmable plan select the plan which pays the
highest price for the new equity? Courts have yet to supply an
answer to this question.
C. Auction Questions
The 203 N. LaSalle opinion stated that new value plans
"providing junior interest holders with exclusive opportunities free
valuation fall
from competition and without benefit of market
11
the
However,
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)."
§
of
prohibition
the
within
be
would
test
market
a
whether
decide
to
declined
Court
Supreme
a
within
bids
competing
or
plans
competing
allowing
by
satisfied
auction
an
First,
options.
several
be
to
appear
There
single plan.
1 19
A second possibility would be that an auction
could be required.
that others are afforded the possibility of
provided
not be required,
of whether alternative plans are
regardless
plans,
filing competing
is that since the Court
possibility
third
a
And
filed.
actually
perhaps a debtor
required,
is
auction
an
that
hold
to
declined
an investment
engaging
by
auction
an
for
need
the
obviate
could
contribution
capital
intended
the
that
decision
a
render
to
banker
1 20
is the best available.
In addition to the core question of whether an auction is
required, there are a number of related questions of more limited
scope. For example, if an auction is required, what kind of
competing bid process is needed? Again, to the extent that courts
any guidance, it is that the determination must be fact
have given
12 1
specific.
117. See, e.g., In re Turner Eng'g, Inc., 109 B.R. 956, 962-63 (Bankr. D.
Mont. 1989).
118. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 458.
see
119. For an argument in favor of mandatory auctions in reorganizations,
J.
15
Reorganizations,
Corporate
for
Case
Uneasy
The
Douglas G. Baird,
LEGAL STUD. 127 (1986).
120. It is worth noting, however, that lack of an auction would effectively
leave the court with the ultimate decision on valuation, which the 203 N.
LaSalle majority sought to avoid.
121. See, e.g., In re CGE Shattuck, 1999 WL 33457789, at *6 ('The precise
in a
means of achieving market competition will be determined on the facts
given case."). Consider also the case of In re Union Financial Services Group,
Inc. In this case, the property was marketed to certain parties and bids were
solicited from these parties. However, an open auction was not conducted. In
re Union Fin. Servs. Group, 303 B.R. at 403-04. The debtor's marketing
process consisted of independent directors who managed the process with the
at
assistance of independent counsel and professional financial advisors. Id.
that
environment
bidding
competitive
425. The result was the creation of a
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Another related question is whether securities regulations
prohibit the type of equity interest sales that the Supreme Court
requires.
The Bankruptcy Code sheds nominal light on the
question. Title 11 U.S.C. § 1145 exempts from registration under
the Federal Securities Act of 1933 and state registration laws
securities which are offered or given in exchange for a claim
against or an interest in the debtor, an affiliate participating in a
joint plan, or a successor to the debtor under its plan. 122 It is
possible that securities issued for new value, not in exchange for a
claim, are not within the exemption.
One question which does seem to have been answered in
regard to auctions is whether credit bidding would be permitted by
secured creditors in a competitive bidding situation. The answer
to this appears to be no. While in general, a secured creditor may
credit bid at auction of an item over which it has a lien,123 this is
was used to test the market, though a traditional auction was not employed.
Id. at 425. Rather, the opportunity to submit competing bids for the
Restructuring Plan as a "whole" as well as the right to bid for parts of the
package was offered to
(i) parties previously expressing interests in acquiring the Debtors, (ii)
companies providing financing and capital investments, (iii) existing
lenders, and (iv) competitors. The marketing process included (i)
establishing a data room, (ii) disseminating sales data, (iii) management
presentations and follow-ups regarding specific due diligence concerns
and (iv) flexibility in the due diligence process and timing for submission
of offers.
Id. at 426. Bids that were received were reviewed by an independent Special
Committee. Id.
The Court approached the question of whether the 203 N. LaSalle test was
satisfied by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 426. It found,
after relying on expert testimony that the marketing process the debtor used
was appropriate, that the process used was fair and satisfied the 203 N.
LaSalle requirements. Id. at 425. Bids were solicited from most of the
country's leading equity, financial services, and investment banking firms.
They were given sufficient time to respond. No bids received offered to pay a
premium price. The court noted that "[tlhe Debtors have complied with the
letter and spirit of 203 North LaSalle Street." Id. at 426. It concluded that
"the appropriateness of any 'market test' for the new value exception to the
absolute priority rule must be evaluated on a case by case basis. The
marketing process utilized by the Debtors ...were more than sufficient to
ensure that a true market test occurred in accordance with the requirements
of 203 North LaSalle Street ....
" Id. The market was given a fair opportunity
to outbid old equity, the court concluded, and it failed to do so. Id.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1145 (a)(1).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k). ("[U]nless the court for cause orders otherwise[,] the
holder of [the secured] claim may bid at such sale, and, if the holder of such
claim purchases such property, such holder may offset such claim against the
purchase price of such property."). The rationale for the credit bid provision is
to give "the secured creditor protections against attempts to sell the collateral
too cheaply; if the secured party thinks the collateral is worth more than the
debtor is selling it for, it may effectively bid its debt and take title to the
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not the case in a new value transaction, because the creditor's
collateral is not what is being auctioned. Rather, what is being
auctioned in such a transaction is the equity of the reorganized
for a court to
debtor. 124 Accordingly, it would be inappropriate
125
circumstance.
this
under
bidding
credit
allow
D. Should the Logic of 203 N. LaSalle Be
Limited to its ParticularFacts?
Courts generally appear reluctant to apply the 203 N. LaSalle
reasoning in slightly different contexts than in relation to the new
126
1129(B(2)(b)(ii).
value exception pursuant under 11 U.S.C. §
127
In this case, an
Consider In re Zenith Electronics Corp.
unofficial committee that represented a class of minority
shareholders objected to a plan under which LGE, a creditor and
controlling shareholder, would be permitted to purchase new
equity in the reorganized debtor in return for a cash infusion and
the release of a sizable claim, while old equity would receive no
distribution. 128 The equity committee invoked 203 N. LaSalle and
requested that the court withhold confirmation because the price
at which LGE would be permitted to buy its new interest had not
29
Arguably, at least, the Court should
been tested by the market.

1129.05[2][b] [ii], at 1129-133 (Henry
property." 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
J. Somer & Alan N. Resnick eds., 15th ed. 1998).
124. See Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge L.P., 248 B.R. 668, 679-80 (D.
Mass 2000) (stating that a credit bid by a secured creditor was inappropriate
because "the reorganization plan provides for a sale of equity in the limited
the
partnership, not a sale of the collateral. The bankruptcy court found that
not
did
and
lien,
Beal's
to
subject
property
of
sale
a
not
was
transaction
improperly frustrate Beal's credit bid rights").
and
125. For a discussion of the issue of credit bidding, see Markell, LaSalle
the Little Guy, supra note 100, at 357-58 (noting that the issue of credit
the
bidding confused things as whether what is being retained or sold is in fact
of credit
creditor's collateral and who its actual owner is). On the question
bidding, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission has stated: "Credit
bidding violates the principle of equality of distribution among all legally
similar creditors. It also undercuts reorganization efforts because it provides
to
the leverage to a secured creditor, by virtue of its unsecured portion of debt,
seize any business in which it is not paid in full." BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT
TWENTY YEARS, supra note 108, § 2.4.15, at 564.
of
procedures
cramdown
the
LaSalle dealt with
126. 203 N.
is
1129(a)(8)
§
plan,
the
for
vote
classes
§ 1129(b)(2)(b)(ii). If all impaired
satisfied, and the cramdown provisions in § 1129(b) are not implicated. See,
Fla.
e.g., In re Annicott Excellence LLC, 258 B.R. 278, 283 n.6 (Bankr. M.D.
the
2001) ("Until such time as an impaired, unsecured class actually rejects
be
not
need
LaSalle]
N.
[203
of
rule
the
Plan, triggering a cramdown,
considered.").
127. 241 B.R. 92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
128. Id. at 97-98.
129. Id. at 106.

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:61

have adopted the Supreme Court's "disfavor for decisions untested
by competitive choice,"3o especially since this was a new value
case.13 ' Instead, the Delaware bankruptcy court made a ruling, in
effect, on the question of standing. The court held that since the
creditor received the right to purchase the equity in its capacity as
a creditor rather than as a shareholder, and that since all classes
of creditors had voted to accept the plan, the absolute priority rule
had no application.132
Rather, the case was governed by
§ 1129(b)(2)(C).133 The court then went on to add the following
statement:
It is not appropriate to extend the ruling of the 203 North
LaSalle case beyond the facts of that case. To do so would
require in all cases that a debtor be placed "on the market"
for sale to the highest bidder. Such a requirement would
eliminate the concept of exclusivity ... and the broad powers
of the debtor to propose a plan in whatever format it
desires .... The restriction on the debtor's right to propose a
plan contained in the 203 North LaSalle case should be
limited to the facts of that case-where the absolute priority

130. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 457-58.
131. For an argument that the bankruptcy court erred in this regard,
see
Barry E. Adler & George G. Triantis, Corporate Bankruptcy in the New
Millenium: The Aftermath of North LaSalle Street, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1225,
1240-42 (2002).
132. The court stated:
[I]n this case, all creditor classes have accepted the Plan and there is no
objection to confirmation by any creditor. Thus, the absolute priority
rule ... is not even applicable.
Rather, section 1129(b)(2)(C) is the
applicable section in this case. Further, in this case, it is not a
shareholder who is being given the right to buy equity, it is LGE in its
capacity as a substantial secured and unsecured creditor who is being
given that right ....
The Supreme Court in 203 North LaSalle did not
say that a plan which allowed a senior secured creditor to buy the equity
violated the Code.
In re Zenith, 241 B.R. at 106. Despite the court's ruling, it is hard to see why
a
potential violation of absolute priority on the part of a creditor is any
less
important than a violation on behalf of a shareholder, if the concern
is
maximizing the price paid to purchase new equity.
133. Section 1129(b)(2)(C) states:
(C) With respect to a class of interests(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class
receive or retain on account of such interest property of a value, as of
the effective date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed
amount of any fixed liquidation preference to which such holder is
entitled, any fixed redemption price to which such holder is entitled,
or the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such
class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior interest any property.
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rule ...is violated.134
For another example of a case where the court failed to apply
fact
the underlying rationale of 203 N. LaSalle to a different
135
this
In
Associates.
Plaza
pattern, consider In re New Midland
would
which
proposal
plan
a
to
case, a secured creditor objected
have forced it to accept a new debt claim. The creditor claimed its
new claim would be worth less than its prior claim, which was
oversecured, yet the plan vested most of the new equity in the old
136 The court declined to expose the proposed plan
equity investors.
to a market test to discover the true value of the new debt, holding
that the absolute priority rule does not apply to secured
creditors. 137 Rather, the court determined, since all impaired,
unsecured classes had accepted the plan, the absolute priority rule
and its ramifications, including the dictates of 203 N. LaSalle,
were inapplicable. Instead, the recourse for the secured creditors
3
was to look solely to the protections found in § 1129(b)(2)(A).' 8
A few courts have in fact extended the 203 N. LaSalle
rationale to non-traditional applications. Perhaps most notably,
39
the court in In re Davis employed the underlying reasoning of
203 N. LaSalle in a case where the debtor was an individual in
After first
Chapter 11140 rather than a business entity.

134. In re Zenith, 241 B.R. at 106.
135. 247 B.R. 877 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2000).
136. Id. at 893-895.
137. Id. The court went on to state that it would not, "through an overexpansive reading of the 'fair and equitable' standard... rewrite paragraph
at
(A) of § 1129(b)(2) to include a rule purposefully excluded by Congress." Id.
894-95.
138. Section 1129(b)(2)(A) states:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides(i) (I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed
amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed
amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's
interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property
that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of
such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and
the treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this
subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent
of such claims.
139. 262 B.R. 791.
file
140. While geared toward business reorganization, individuals may also
in Chapter 11. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 161 (1991).
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determining that the absolute priority rule applies to individual
debtors in Chapter 11,141 the court went on to apply 203 N.
LaSalle, denying confirmation based on the absence of any market
type mechanism in the debtor's proposed plan. 142
E. Can a Mortgage Deficiency Claim Be Classified
Separately in Order to Obtain an Accepting Class?
In order to confirm a Chapter 11 plan which impairs a class of
claimants, at least one impaired class of non-insiders must vote for
the plan.143 According to the Code, a plan may place a claim in a
particular class only if the claim is substantially similar to other
claims in the class.144 The Code does not expressly indicate
whether similar claims must be classified together. As a result,
the question of gerrymandering classes for voting purposes has
long been an issue in bankruptcy cases.1 45
In 203 N. LaSalle, the debtor's plan placed Bank of America's
mortgage deficiency claim in a separate class from other
unsecured claims. The purpose of this, presumably, was to create
an impaired class of creditors that (without the Bank's deficiency
claim voted to the contrary) would vote to accept the plan.146 The
legitimacy of this tactic was neither raised nor addressed by the
Supreme Court in 203 N. LaSalle. The courts that have addressed
the issue post-203 N. LaSalle have generally allowed this separate
classification on the basis that while the claims of a mortgage
deficiency holder and of general unsecured creditors enjoy the
141. The court noted the harshness of applying the absolute priority rule to
individuals, stating:
The broad sweep of the term "any property" may be felt to be harsher on
the individual than on the corporate Chapter 11 debtor .... Individuals
who file Chapter 11 cases must necessarily retain a residual interest in
their economic future since there is no effective way to alienate all
future accessions to their net worth ....
"In
summary, the
jurisprudence apparently unanimously holds that if the Debtor retains
any property, even control or the potential for future earnings, the
cramdown provisions of Section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) are not met."
In re Davis, 262 B.R. at 797 (quoting In re East, 57 B.R. 14, 17 (Bankr. M.D.
La. 1985) (citations omitted).
142. In re Davis, 262 B.R. at 798.
143. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
144. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a).
145. The leading case on the issue perhaps remains Teamsters Nat'l Freight
Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Truck Co.), 800 F.2d
581 (6th Cir. 1986).
146. If classified together, the bank's deficiency claim would in effect have
had a veto power over the other unsecured claimants. For a discussion, see
David Gray Carlson, Artificial Impairment and the Single Asset Chapter 11
Case, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 339, 347-53 (1994). See also David Gray Carlson,
Chapter 11 Issues: The Classification Veto in Single-Asset Cases Under
Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(10), 44 S.C. L. REV. 565 (1993).
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same legal status (unsecured), the interests of the respective
and the potential survival of the
parties in the reorganization
147
align.
to
debtor are unlikely
What Is the Minimum Acceptable Bid by Old Equity?
The Supreme Court in 203 N. LaSalle fixed a minimum bid
requirement for old equity: Old equity's price is too low when the
equity holders obtain or preserve an ownership interest "for less
'148 This serves the purpose of
than someone else would have paid.
providing greatest possible addition to the bankruptcy estate. In
addition, it reduces the prospect of an excessively leveraged
reorganized company where the creditors would bear much of the
risk.1 49 But the 203 N. LaSalle court left open the question of
whether old equity must bid higher than the next highest150bid, as
Preseemingly was required by the Second Circuit in Coltex.
the
of
substance
the
weighed
courts
some
203 N. LaSalle,
than
rather
claims,
unsecured
total
the
to
compared
contribution
151 "This. . . , of
compared to the value of the reorganized firm.
course, is irrelevant for the viability of the reorganized
F.

147. See In re Am. HomePatient, Inc., 298 B.R. 152, 167-68 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 2003) (authorizing separate classification of deficiency and other
secured claims, and noting that "[c]lassification of unsecured claims is
measured by a flexible standard in the Sixth Circuit. Although abuse of the
voting process through 'creative' classification is prohibited, separate
classification of unsecured claims with dissimilar attributes or interests is
allowed" (citations omitted)); Beal Bank, 248 B.R. at 691 (reasoning that
separate classification of a nonrecourse claim is allowed, as the deficiency
claim holder had different motivations in voting and there was no evidence of
an improper business justification for the classification scheme); In re Greate
Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 251 B.R. 213, 224-25 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2000)
(explaining that a separate classification of deficiency allowed a deficiency
claim that awarded debt and equity representing the entire equity value of the
debtor, wlhereas the trade claimants received a cash payout). Cf. In re
SunCruz Casinos LLC, 298 B.R. 833, 838 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2003) ("Although
the proponent of a plan of reorganization has considerable discretion to
classify claims and interests according to the facts and circumstances of the
case, this discretion is not unlimited .... If the plan unfairly creates too many
or too few classes, if the classifications are designed to manipulate class
voting, or if the classification scheme violates basic priority rights, the plan
cannot be confirmed.") (quoting Olympia & York Fla. Equity Corp. v. Bank of
N.Y., 913 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir. 1990); Boston Post Rd. L.P. v. FDIC (In re
Boston Post Rd. L.P.), 21 F.3d 477, 484 (2d Cir. 1994) (refusing to confirm
cramdown when the only accepting class was "segregated without any
demonstrated legitimate reason from like unsecured creditors. .
148. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 453.
149. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 104, at 13.
150. 138 F.3d at 45.
151. See In re Arc Water Treatment, No. 96-31144DWS, 1998 WL732875, at
*5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1998); In re Pocono Springs Co., No. 97-13534,
1998 WL 151423 at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1998).
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entity . . .,"152 so it should not affect "the propriety of the plan."153
Post-203 N. LaSalle, there does not appear yet to be any
conclusive statement in the case law on this issue.154 All that is
clear is that the contribution must be reasonably equivalent to the
interest being retained. 155

G. New ContributionsMust Be Necessary to the Reorganization.
Particularly relevant to the 203 N. LaSalle decision is the
requirement that the new value be "necessary" for the
reorganization. In Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,156
Justice Douglas posited that there will be "the necessity, at times,
of seeking new money 'essential to the success of the undertaking'
from the old stockholders."157 Justice Douglas may have intended
that old equity owners should participate only when the market
would not supply working capital at (presumably) lower cost. This
raises the question of what in fact constitutes "necessity."
In evaluating this, there appear to be two logically distinct,
critical questions. The first is what the contribution will be used
for. If the new value is desired solely to overcome the absolute
priority rule, rather than because it is necessary to repair or alter
property owned by the debtor, the new value is not necessary to
the reorganization.
The second question goes to the available sources for capital.
Prior to 203 N. LaSalle, the Seventh Circuit had suggested that
the debtor must have no alternative source of capital other than
fresh contributions by old equity. 158 The Second Circuit in Coltex
admitted that its strict interpretation of the necessity requirement
was another method to ensure that former equity holders do not
obtain their new interests "on account of' their old equity.1 59
Under their holding, old equity must be the lender of last resort. 16 0
Post-203 N. LaSalle, it remains unclear whether the "necessity"
requirement includes that old equity be the sole available source of
financing for the new entity.
152. Georgakopoulos, supra note 104, at 13.
153. Id.
154. For an argument that 203 N. LaSalle requires equity to do more than
match the next best offer, see Harvey R. Miller et al., Leaving Old Questions
Unanswered and Raising New Ones: The Supreme Court Furthers the New
Value Controversy in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203
North LaSalle Street Partnership, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 553, 589 (2000).
155. 203 N. LaSalle, 526 U.S. at 456-57.
156. 308 U.S. 106.
157. Id. at 121.
158. See Official Creditors' Comm. v. Potter Material Serv., Inc. (In re Potter
Material Serv.), Inc., 781 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1986).
159. Coltex, 138 F.3d at 42.
160. Id. at 45.
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H. Must the New Value ContributedBe Used to Pay Creditorsor
for Working Capital Needs, or Can It Be Used for Both?
The last of the "open questions" relates to how the fresh
capital is employed. Most of the cases agree that a capital infusion
is "necessary for an effective reorganization" where it is needed to
make initial payments under the plan and to pay for maintenance
and/or improvements to the debtor's property, especially the
latter. 161 While some courts have held that if money is used to pay
pre-confirmation expenses or creditors the necessity requirement
is not satisfied, 162 203 N. LaSalle may suggest otherwise. Since
one purpose of the market test is to increase payments to
creditors, an argument based on 203 N. LaSalle appears to exist
that using new capital to pay pre-confirmation creditors is an
163
Again, any sort of
acceptable use of the new cash infusion.
definitive answer to this question by the lower courts has yet to be
forthcoming.
161. See Baseline-Dobson Ctr. Real Estate L.P., 193 B.R. 284, 290 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1994); In re HRC Joint Venture, 187 B.R. 202, 210 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio

1995); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Elmwood, Inc. (In re Elmwood, Inc.), 182
B.R. 845, 852-53 (D. Nev. 1995); In re Dean, 166 B.R. 949, 956 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1994). But see In re One Times Square Assocs. L.P., 159 B.R. 695, 707-08
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that a contribution used solely for capital
improvements which would inure primarily to future benefit of equity holders
rather than creditors was not necessary for an effective reorganization);
Oxford Life Ins. Co. v. Tucson Self-Storage, Inc. (In re Tucson Self-Storage,
Inc.), 166 B.R. 892, 899 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (arguing that a capital
contribution is not "necessary" when used merely to pay priority and
administrative claimants).
162. Rather, it must be for working capital. See Georgakopoulos, supra note
104, at 13-17. Professors Carlson and Williams have argued that the text of
the Code itself supports such an analysis. See Carlson & Williams, supra note
75, at 1318-19. See also Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close
Corporationsand the Absolute PriorityRule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 98 (1989)
("There is simply no necessary connection between the use of the new
contribution exception and benefit to creditors.").
163. But see Georgakopoulos, supra note 104, at 16.
Indeed, the contribution of cash can arguably never be "necessary" for
the reorganization of the debtor. If the cash is distributed to the
creditors it violates absolute priority. If the cash is used to pay
operating expenses, the debtor is not profitable as an independent
entity, and is likely to become insolvent again, thus failing the
corresponding test of 1129(a)(11).
Id. Section 1129(a)(11) requires that "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to
be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization,
of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such
liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan." See also Carlson &
Williams, supra note 75, at 1308 ("If unsecured creditors are entitled to
receive the proceeds of new value as if the new value were property of the
estate, then it becomes impossible for reorganized firms ever to raise new
capital.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in 203 N. LaSalle raised as
many, if not more, questions than it answered in regard to new
value plans in Chapter 11 reorganizations. While the critical
question-the ongoing existence of the exception-appears to have
been definitively answered, much of the process-which in most
instances has major substantive ramifications-necessary to
confirm a new value plan remains murky. Five years post-203 N.
LaSalle, lower courts have done little to definitively define the
parameters under which a new value plan should be confirmed.
As a result, these "open issues" are likely to continue to be
contested pending some more definitive judicial resolutions than
have thus far been set forth.

